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Abstract
We report here a complete experimental realization of one-way decoy-pulse quantum key distri-
bution, demonstrating an unconditionally secure key rate of 5.51 kbps for a 25.3 km fibre length.
This is two orders of magnitudes higher than the value that can be obtained with a non-decoy
system. We introduce also a simple test for detecting the photon number splitting attack and
highlight that it is essential for the security of the technique to fully characterize the source and
detectors used.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd Quantum Cryptography
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Communication with single photons promises for the first time a method to exchange dig-
ital keys between two remote parties (referred to as Alice and Bob),1,2,3 the secrecy of which
are not reliant upon assumptions about an eavesdropper’s surveillance equipment, comput-
ing power or guile.4,5 Currently, however, the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) is
compromised by the multi-photon pulses inevitably produced by the attenuated lasers used
in today’s systems.6,7 In the photon number splitting (PNS) attack, an eavesdropper (Eve)
preferentially transmits these multi-photon pulses to Bob through a lossless channel after
removing part for measurement, while blocking a correponding number of single photon
pulses to maintain the same detection rate at Bob.8 By doing so, she can determine part,
or all, of the key while remaining hidden.
Recently it has been proposed that the PNS attack may be foiled using decoy pulses, with
a different average intensity from the signal pulses.9,10,11,12 By determining the transmission
of the signal and decoy pulses separately, Alice and Bob are able to detect PNS attacks.
An early experiment13 has already demonstrated the feasibility of the decoy pulse protocol,
although using a send-and-return architecture for which Alice does not have full control of
the individual pulse intensities, as required for its secure implementation. We report here
a complete experimental demonstration of one-way decoy pulse QKD over 25.3 km fibre
with a continuous key rate of 5.51 kbps, which is unconditionally secure against all types of
attacks, including PNS.
Decoy pulse QKD theory gives a rigorous bound of the characteristics of the single photon
pulses, which are the only source pulses that contribute to the secure bit rate.14,15 In the
simplest decoy protocol,12 two different average pulse intensities (referred to as signal and
decoy pulses) with mean photon numbers of µ and ν (µ > ν) respectively are used. By
measuring the transmittances Qµ and Qν , i.e., Bob’s detection probability of a signal or
decoy pulse respectively, the lower bound (QL1 ) of the single photon transmittance, which is
defined as the joint probability that a signal pulse contains only one photon and the pulse
is detected by Bob, can be written as12,13
QL1 =
µ2e−µ
µν − ν2
(QLν e
ν −Qνe
µ ν
2
µ2
− εµQµe
µµ
2 − ν2
1
2
µ2
) (1)
where εµ is the bit error rate of the signal pulses, and Q
L
ν is the lower bound of the decoy
pulse transmittance, estimated conservatively as 10 standard deviations of Qν from the
measurement value, ensuring a confidence interval of 1 − 1.5 × 10−23. By assuming all bit
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errors are from single photon pulses, the upper bound, εU1 , for the bit error rate of the single
photon pulses can be bounded as
εU1 =
εµQµ
QL1
(2)
With the bounds QL1 and ε
U
1 available, the secure bit rate is readily calculated, which will
be shown later.
We use a one-way fibre-optic QKD system with phase encoding, schematically shown in
Fig. 1. It uses two asymmetric Mach-Zender interferometers for encoding and decoding.
The sending (Alice) and receiving (Bob) units are connected with a 25.3 km fibre spool.
Both the signal and decoy pulses are generated by a 1.55 µm pulsed laser diode of fixed
intensity operating at 7.143 MHz. The pulses are modulated with an intensity modulator
to produce the desired ratio of signal pulse strength to decoy pulse strength, and are then
strongly attenuated to the desired level by an attenuator before leaving Alice’s apparatus.
Synchronization is realized by multiplexing a 1.3 µm clock signal with the quantum signals so
that clock and quantum signals can be sent through the same fibre. An active stabilization
technique16 is used to ensure continuous operation.
Two single photon detectors based on InGaAs avalanche photodiodes are carefully pre-
pared for the experiment. Care was taken to minimize detector afterpulsing,17 which cor-
relates photon detection events of the signal and decoy pulses and prevents faithful mea-
surements of Qµ and Qν . The system detection efficiency, including channel transmission
loss (4.7 dB) and Bob’s loss (2.5 dB), was characterized at 1.95 × 10−2. The sum of the
dark count rates for the two detectors was 9.4 × 10−5 per pulse. Custom electronics were
developed for driving the QKD optics.
We implemented the one weak decoy state + BB84 protocol12 in our experiment. The
decoy pulse probability is chosen to be 1/4. Each QKD session is set to be 1 × 106 sifted
bits, including both signal and decoy pulses, corresponding to approximately 2×106 photon
detection events. The signal and decoy pulse intensities are chosen as µ = 0.425 and ν =
0.204 to provide optimum secure bit rate.
We recorded the output from the decoy QKD experiment continuously for four hours,
during which a total of 372 QKD sessions were executed, each lasting 38.7 s on average.
The measured bit error rates (εµ, εν) for signal and decoy states, as shown in Fig. 2(a),
are stable at 1.72% and 2.74% respectively. These values are consistent with the measured
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interferometer visibility, mis-compensation, and detector dark counts. Transmittances Qµ
and Qν , shown in Fig. 2(b), fluctuate in tandem, and such fluctuation is attributed mainly
to variation of the channel transmission and the detection efficiency. The sharp dips in
Qµ and Qν are due to polarization or phase resets of the active alignment system, during
which photons were temporarily not counted. Figure 2(c) shows the measured ratio of
Qµ/Qν , which remains virtually constant despite the larger fluctuations in Qµ and Qν . The
measured ratio is remarkably consistent with the theoretically expected (red line), indicating
the system has produced and detected both signal and decoy pulses reliably.
The final secure bit rate, R, was obtained, after estimating QL1 and ε
U
1 using Eqns. (1)
and (2), by first applying a modified Cascade18 error correction routine, followed by privacy
amplification,19 using
R ≥ {−NSiftµ fecH2(εµ) +N
Sift
1 [1−H2(ε
U
1 )]}/t (3)
where NSiftµ is the number of the sifted bits from the signal pulses, N
Sift
1 =
1
2
QL1 t the lower
bound of the number of the sifted bits for the single photon pulses, and t is the QKD session
time. H2(ε) = −ε log2(ε)− (1− ε) log2(1− ε) is the binary Shannon entropy. fec is the error
correction efficiency relative to Shannon limit. Our error correction module gives fec ≈ 1.10
for the given bit error rate.
As shown in Fig. 3, the secure bit rate remains fairly stable and positive for all decoy
sessions, with an average value of 5.51 kbps. The rate is much higher than a non-decoy
QKD system. For a non-decoy system using the same detectors, we found the maximum
fibre length secure from the PNS attack to be just 9 km. With quieter detectors, a secure
bit rate of 43 bps was previously achieved for 25 km of fiber.20 Thus, our implementation
of the decoy protocol has allowed more than two orders of magnitude enhancement in the
secure bit rate.
To detect the PNS and related attacks, Alice and Bob can monitor the ratio Qν/Qµ.
In the current experiment, we expected a ratio of Qν/Qµ
.
= νη+Y0
µη+Y0
= 0.486, where η is the
system detection efficiency and Y0 is the dark count rate. Significant deviation of the mea-
sured ratio from this expected value indicates a PNS by Eve. In the PNS attack, Eve first
counts the number of photons in each pulse using a quantum non-demolition measurement
and preferentially transmits the multiphoton pulses to Bob. Since the signal pulses are
stronger than the decoy pulses, and thus contain more multi-photon pulses, the PNS will
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tend to reduce Qν/Qµ. Figure 4 shows a simulation, together with the experimental points,
of the secure bit rate dependence on the ratio Qν/Qµ. The experimental data is in excellent
agreement with theory when the PNS is not present. With the PNS attack present, the sim-
ulated secure bit rate decreases rapidly with the ratio Qν/Qµ. No secure bit rate is possible
when the ratio is merely 17% smaller than expected, highlighting the privacy amplification
cost to remove information leaked by the PNS attack. Such a sensitive dependence puts
stringent requirements on the preparation and measurement of the signal and decoy pulses.
The measured ratio may be slightly higher than expected due to statistical uncertainty, or
if Eve chooses to preferentially transmit the single photon pulses. A more likely case of the
measured ratio exceeding the expected value is due to artifacts, such as mis-calibration of
signal and decoy intensity ratio and/or detector afterpulsing. Such artifacts would cause
an over-estimation of secure bit rate, thereby compromising security, and must therefore be
carefully eliminated. This has been achieved in our experiment by careful calibration of the
source and detectors.
Secure bit rate is dependent on the session duration due to the statistical certainty with
which εU1 and Q
L
1 can be estimated. Longer sessions allow a more precise determinate and
a higher bit rate. It can be seen in Fig. 5 that the calculated secure bit rate increases with
session duration, approaching the maximum value for sessions exceeding 1000 seconds. Due
to statistical fluctuations, there is a minimum session time for establishing a secure bit rate,
found here to be around 0.4 s. We perform decoy protocol QKD at three distinct session
times: 9.2, 18.5, and 38.7 s, and results are shown also in Fig. 5. Even with the shortest
time of 9.2 s, a secure bit rate of 4.80 kbps is achieved, which is about 78% of the saturation
rate with infinite session time, demonstrating that long session times are not necessary for
decoy pulse QKD.
In summary, a practical one-way decoy QKD system has been demonstrated over a
25.3 km fiber with an average bit rate of 5.51 kbps. It is unconditionally secure against
all types of attacks, including the PNS attack. We conclude that decoy pulses improve
the security and performance of weak pulse QKD. However, sources and detectors must be
calibrated accurately to avoid any artifacts that may compromise security.
During preparation of this manuscript two other implementations of decoy pulse QKD
have appeared.21,22 These show operation over longer fibre spools but with much lower key
generation rates and are limited to local synchronization.
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FIG. 1: Schematics of optical layout of the one-way decoy quantum key distribution system using
BB84 phase-encoding; Attn: Attenuator; IM: intensity modulator; LD1: signal laser diode at
1.55µm; LD2: clock laser diode at 1.3µm; PC: polarisation controller; WDM: wavelength division
multiplexer; D0, D1: single photon detectors.
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FIG. 2: Experimental results of a continuous series of decoy-QKD sessions for four hours. (a)
Bit error rates measured for the signal and decoy pulses; (b) The measured transmittances for
the signal pulses (Qµ) and decoy pulses (Qν); (c) The measured ratio Qµ/Qν (empty squares) in
comparison with the expected value (line).
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FIG. 3: Secure bit rate as a function of time.
0.4 0.5 0.6
102
103
104
 Artifacts
Experiment
 Simulation
 
 
S
ec
ur
e 
B
it 
R
at
e 
(b
ps
)
Q /Q
Expected Value
PNS Attack
FIG. 4: Simulated (solid line) and experimental (symbols) secure bit rate dependence on the
transmittance ratio Qν/Qµ. The vertical dotted line indicates the expected ratio.
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FIG. 5: Simulated (solid line) and experimental (symbols) secure bit rate as a function of QKD
session duration. The dotted line shows the saturation secure bit rate with infinite QKD sesssion
time.
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